Yerevan's best kept secret?: The Gök (Blue) Mosque

Yerevan's unique mosque is a surprisingly imposing religious complex covering more than 70,000 sq.ft of prime land in the Center of the capital. Being an Iranian mosque, it follows the Twelver Shi'ite branch of Islam, as Shi'ism was proclaimed state religion of the Persia by the Safavid Empire from the early 16th century and on. (Photo: SasunsyDavit)

The tiny Republic of Armenia never ceases to amaze and surprise the world with its vast cultural heritage and important landmarks disproportionate to its size. The landlocked country in the Caucasus in the Highlands of biblical Mount Ararat has an area of under 30,000 km.sq. with a population of around 3 million. Since the fall of the Soviet bloc in 1991 it regained its independence and now is being discovered by visitors and investors from around the Globe.

Understandably the capital Yerevan is the magnet attracting the new investments, developments and the lion's share of all the visitors who comb the country and are left amazed by the vast variety of natural beauties and the cultural heritage that the country has to offer. Yet, quite amazingly, one if the best kept secrets of Armenia's Capital Yerevan seems to evade most tourists, even many locals.

"So you stayed at the Marriott Hotel in the city center. Did you also visit the nearby Blue Mosque?", I would ask out of curiosity.

-"What mosque? There are no mosques we know of in Yerevan" is the most frequent answer I get.

Yet this big Yerevan mosque is right there, just a few hundred feet away from Armenia's "Point Zero", the epicenter of the country: the Republic square (Hanrapetutyan Hrabarag). Moreover, It is a pretty imposing and rather pleasing complex just a heartbeat away from the Opera or the Marriott. I have literally seen thousands of photographs of every relevant and irrelevant structure and site in Yerevan. Every little commemorative palque, statue, fountain, street corner is proudly photographed by the visitors, but I have never seen one photo of this proud Mosque.

No wonder people miss this unique mosque. It is right opposite the main popular produce market on the Mashdots avenue, but it is hidden almost entirely behind rather ugly apartment buildings that surround it completely (see map below).

Yerevan's unique mosque is nicknamed "Blue", surely because of the predominant color of the entrance and the exterior tiles. (Photo: SasunsyDavit)

This only surviving mosque in Yerevan is called the the Gök mosque (Blue or Sky Blue Mosque), known or Kapuyt Mezgit (Կապոյտ մզկիթ) in Armenian. It sits on an imposing 75,000 sq.ft of land, has an inner courtyard, meeting halls as well as a theological school (madrasa). The single brick and tile laden minaret towers over the complex.

The exact origins of the mosque may be little fuzzy, but it was certainly constructed to its present dimensions in around 1764 and completed within the same decade.The mosque is said to have been commissioned under the patronage of the local Governor or ruler Hussein Ali Khan. That was of course a period of yet another Persian dominion over the eastern Armenian territories after it was taken from the Ottoman Empire.  At the time Yerevan was a provincial town, probably with 20,000 inhabitants but was nonetheless influential, with the Armenian Apostolic Holy Seat at Etchmiadzin  just a short distance away. 

Yerevan and Eastern Armenia of course eventually fell under Russian influence and direct rule after 1827 and the Treaty of Turkmenchay, which gave Russia its modern zones of influence relative to Persia and Turkey of the day. This treaty came as a result of the Russo-Persian wars which resulted in crushing defeats for Iran. Turkmenchay is a town in the Azerbaijan province of modern Iran, where the defeated Persians signed and recognized the Imperial Russian dominion over the "Yerevan", "Nakhitchevan" and "Talish" Khanates (administrative provinces under the authority of a Khan). One of the the main results of the treaty was the establishment of the Arax river (Araz, Արաքս)  as the recognized boundary between Russian zone of direct influence and Iran. This is still true today, as Arax forms the actual borders between Azerbaijan and Iran and southern Armenia.

                                     (Click on photo to enlarge for details) 

Yerevan: The Persian mosque called the Gök Jamii (Blue  Mosque) can be seen as the black dot 24 in the center. Note how it is pretty much hidden by all the surrounding Apartments despite its central location. It is only one block away from the Hanraptutyun (Republic) square, the "Point Zero" of Armenia (at the center right in yellow). Marriott Yerevan, formerly "Armenia" hotel is the number 22. Next up is the Ministry of Foreign affairs.

According to some reliable sources, there were around 10 functional mosques in the Yerevan region before the arrival of the Russians. These mosques were eventually abandoned or demolished except of course the Blue Mosque. During the Soviet era, this mosque suffered the same tragic fate as most of the churches in the deeply christian tiny country of Armenia. The communists implemented extreme secular policies, forcibly closing churches and putting all religious institutions under heavy pressure. The Blue Mosque was of course no exception and was in pitiful condition as well during these communist dark ages. After the fall of the Soviet Union the mosque underwent radical and somehow controversial restoration with funding provided by the Iranian Government. Some critics argued the restorations were not truthful to the original spirit of the mosque.

The very intriguing question as to why the Yerevan Blue mosque is surrounded from all sides with apartments buildings and thus literally hidden from view except a rather modest entrance on the Mashdotz avenue?  The first logical explanation would be to assume that there was a certain bigotry or conspiracy on the part of the Armenians to ''neutralize'' the Muslim Mosque from general view. In fact the encirclement of the mosque by apartment buildings is almost complete. But it is very safe to say that there was no "foul play" involved on the part of the Christian Armenians. On the contrary, care was exercised to include the whole complex in the new block without any architectural "dissections".

Armenia's capital:  Yerevan in the shadow of the snow-capped heights of Mount Ararat, where it is said Biblical Noah's Ark landed escaping the Great Flood. Yerevan's modern urban plan is most obvious with this aerial view. The Ararat mountain with its two peaks has always been at the very center of Armenian history and identity and is sacred to its people. Today it lies in Turkey, just across the border. Alexander Tamanian drew the modern Yerevan city plans (bottom)

The simple explanation of the mosque's bizarre encirclement is that Yerevan underwent a major urban plan during the Soviet times. The city center was completely overhauled and redesigned, just the same way say Baron Haussman transformed central Paris arteries during the 19th century. Renowned architects (especially Alexander Tamanian) undertook the major task of modernizing Yerevan and the new general plan was executed (see Yerevan city map above for the modern design). Therefore the Blue mosque happened to fall in the middle of a new grid or block and was surrounded by new buildings along the new avenues. The blue Mosque was preserved.  In any case, destroying it would have been both stupid and criminal.

Yerevan's best kept secret?: The apartment buildings completely encircle the mosque and make it almost impossible for an outside passer-by to see it, even from the major Mashdots or Khorenatsi avenues. Yet this mosque is a joy to see, appreciate and pay a visit.

When I discovered this mosque while trying to find a shortcut from the Mashdotz avenue to my hotel in the mid nineties, the exterior was being repaired by at least six workers albeit with rather primitive methods and equipments. The pace of the works seemed very slow albeit continuous. The mosque is presently functional and is an important meeting point for the local tiny Muslim population and expatriate students studying in Armenian Universities.

Is the Yerevan Blue Mosque a masterpiece in Persian Shiite Islamic architecture? Not so by any stretch of imagination. However it is a historical place of worship that deserves a visit, a photo or two and all the care the Armenian people and Government can give to this unique mosque of the Capital.

The recent referendum in Switzerland imposing a ban on the construction of minarets next to the mosques was a sure indication of the needless and somehow understandable but unnecessary and often ridiculous clashes between these two great monotheistic religions: Islam and Christianity. In this late Swiss episode many protest voices were heard, but similar attitudes of intolerance and exclusion exists all around the world. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, existing churches do not even look like actual churches from the exterior. No crosses are allowed, no visible signs such as stained glasses or statues. Same story on a lesser extent in Kuwait City, where the main Church next to the Sheraton had no cross as not to insult the locals. In some of these these countries the construction and maintenance of any Christian worship place faces more hurdles than the erection of the Great Wall of China!

The landscaping around the perimeter is a disaster, yet seemingly "normal" and somehow acceptable for that part of the world. Fortunately, the "exotic" charm of this mosque is not lost. The brick minaret with staggered patterns is typical of Persian-Mesopotamian traditions.   

The Saudis, for example, have imposed a series of non surmountable pre-conditions effectively banning any church constructions. At the core of all this is their insistence that the Catholic church in particular somehow "recognize the prophet Mohamed", even though unclear in what exact capacity. Such conditions are vague and poisonous. Essential human rights and the freedom of all people to practice their  faith freely must be beyond any ridiculous restrictions from all sides. The same is true to the Muslim communities that may suffer unnecessary conditions, harassment, discrimination and exaggerated sets of rules and regulations here and there. 

In this day and age when religious intolerance is growing like a cancer both in East and West, the World deserves more positive winds of openness, goodwill and a minimum of tolerance. Armenians have had major issues with peoples acting in the name of Islam. Armenians have suffered immensely and have paid the ultimate price of abuses perpetrated against them in the name of religious correctness. This is the reason why the recent restoration and the preservation of this Blue mosque in the middle of Yerevan should serve as an example of tolerance and respect towards minorities to others. Armenian churches are crumbling both in  Turkey and even in Christian Georgia (Capital: Tbilisi), where the central government has to come clean and act responsibly towards its minorities.

In any case, it is very clear that Yerevan is a richer place with this Blue mosque than without it.

The Blue Mosque mosque complex from the back oozes Persian architectural forms, even though not in its purest forms. The finishing is rough, but functionality and cost cutting consideration obviously have prevailed. The  Yerevan mosque should not be confused with the Blue Mosque of Istanbul, the incredible "Sultanahmet" with its six minarets, an architectural masterpiece of the highest order. Another famous "Blue mosque" of course is in Tabriz (Iran) which was heavily damaged by an earthquake in 1779 and only recently mostly repaired.

Minimalistic approach: The interior of the Yerevan Blue Mosque is beautiful in its simplicity yet lacks the "wow" factor. No interior tiles or typical Islamic calligraphy in this part. The Mihrab (the niche in the wall indicating the direction of Mecca) and the Minbar (the pulpit with stairs for the Imam's sermon) are very simple and functional. The carpet has patterns marking individual worshipers allocated floor space and prayer direction.

 

 Yerevan, Armenia circa 1672, then till under Persian suzerainty until 1827. It was a provincial city. In early 20th century and during the Armenian genocide of 1915 thousands of refugees and survivors found refuge there and eventually it became the Capital of the First Republic of Armenia proclaimed in May 28, 1918. It has remained so since and today it has an estimated population of 1.2 million. 

©Krikor Tersakian, Dec. 2009

Editor's notes:  

• Note: Armenia has very rich historical monuments and can be regarded as an open air museum. Day trips from Yerevan can take the visitors to almost all destinations. Armenia was the first nation to adopt Christianity as a state religion in AD 301. Thousand year old churches, Stone crosses (Khatchkars) and other monuments are there to be discovered and awe any visitor. Since the fall of the Soviet Union it is an independent state again and an emerging democracy. Three sites in modern Armenia are included on the UNESCO World Heritage Site list, having outstanding universal value and meeting the tough selection criteria. Links to the UNESCO website:
• Monasteries of Haghpat and Sanahin
  
• Cathedral and Churches of Echmiatsin and the Archaeological Site of Zvartnots
• Monastery of Geghard and the Upper Azat Valley

Photo: Geghard or Keghart rock-carved monastery

First Anniversary of Georgia's bloodied nose

Georgia's ill fated attempt to reclaim South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a total disaster. Was it wrong advice from "friends" or just an Indiana Jones style adventure from Tbilisi? Russia did not lose time to crush the over optimistic Georgians and practically annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Click on map to enlarge.

August 7-8, 2008 were memorable days.

The whole world was glued to the TV sets for the stunning opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. The "Bird's Nest", or the Beijing National Stadium had become the epicenter of the world.

Yet on practically the same day, the tiny Caucasian state of Georgia had launched massive attacks on the secessionist South Ossetia province, directly challenging Russia. The timing of the Georgian attack was very bizarre and intriguing: A major offensive within a few hours of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremonies? What was going on and who was really pushing for such a suicidal showdown?

The Georgian government claimed it was only responding to the constant shelling and intimidation from South Ossetia and was forced to send in its tanks to retake the rebel-held regional capital Tsikavali. Tbilisi wanted to swiftly reoccupy South Ossetia, but this large scale offensive was bizarre both in its timing and the ultra optimism about its possible success. Moscow did not find all this funny and the Russian Bear got ready to pounce back, and it did.

Georgia's tensions with Russia and the two breakaway regions have always been high since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but they became even higher ever since Mikhael Saakashvili came to power on 25 January 2004. The new President was determined to move Georgia much closer to the Western sphere and out of the Russian zone of influence, as if Russia did not exist next door. Georgia demanded the closure of all Russian military bases on its territories, put itself firmly in the Western camp, established supposedly very close ties with the "Oil and Gas obsessed" Bush administration and even applied to join NATO as a full member state: this was the ultimate insult to Russia.

Georgia's anti Russian stance since the fall of the Soviet empire was amplified by the training of the Georgian troops by some 170 NATO military advisers and were supplied with Western military fatigues and some military hardware. The Georgians obviously came to have a highly overestimated and distorted image of their new military might and political support from the forces opposing Russia. And that proved to be a fatal miscalculation.

Mr Saakashvili was also eagerly waiting for the day he would try to bring a military solution to the Ossetia and Abkhazia problems and restore Tbilisi's authority over these regions once and for all, just like he had successfully done in Adjaria-Batumi in 2004. (Important to note that Adjaria has no common borders with Russia, an crucial fact in Georgia's military success).



The message from this Russian soldier to the Georgians is finger clear. The picture is of a Russian convoy on the battlefront. The Russian easily crushed all forms of organised Georgian armed resistance.


Moscow's response was pretty swift, with mounting pressure to destabilize the Georgian Government through South Ossetia and of Abkhazia, which both share long borders and close ties with Russia. Moscow claimed to be under the obligation to defend the Russian citizens of these provinces and moved towards the recognition of these regions as "independent". Just like the West had acted to recognize the legitimacy of Kosovo's Independence from Serbia. Therefore the rationale was straight forward:If the West can recognize a separate Kosovo, then why not recognize independent Ossetia and Abkhazia? Georgia called all these developments as "shameless land grabs", while Moscow called them "self determination of these freedom seeking Russian citizens".

The war between the two looked inevitable, but few expected Saakashvili to send in his troops first! The ant attacking the elephant type of a mismatch.

In any case, something went wrong with president Saakashvili's entourage, when he decided to force a war. He had indeed timed this military attacks to coincide with the Olympics despite the claims otherwise, but that looked a bit like a medieval military strategy. Countries used to attack enemy states when the other King was away for a while on a hunting expedition in the remote woods or attending a prince's week long wedding festivities...

Vladimir Putin was in fact in Beijing when the news of the attacks broke out, but he did not waste any time to fly to the conflict zone and assume direct control of the events and assume the driver's seat. Within a few hours Moscow had already moved in. The Russian army recaptured South Ossetia and the tanks were on their way to Gori, into Georgia proper. The Russians soon cut the main road linking the capital Tbilisi to the ports on the Black Sea. All significant military and strategic sites in Georgia were bombarded and the country's fragile infrastructure heavily damaged or simply occupied. The Russian Black Sea fleet imposed a total maritime embargo. Poti and the nearby town of Seneki were taken. Russian troops reached the outskirts of Tbilisi and established checkpoints. The Tbilisi international airport was shut down, while the military airfields of Marneuli and Vaziani were heavily bombed.

Like in most wars, the civilian populations paid the ultimate price, as tens of thousands were ethnically cleansed and expelled from their homes. More than 400 people lost their lives, thousands injured and many more lost their homes and were unfortunately displaced.
A Georgian woman holding her baby cries over her damaged home in Gori, Georgia, just outside the breakaway province of South Ossetia Aug. 10, 2008. (David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters)




Georgia was practically fragmented into pieces and Tbilisi government was reduced to a mere scared spectator's role, hiding in underground shelters and arranging for the occasional candlelight press conferences to the media.

Naturally the war affected the whole region. Landlocked Armenia was deeply affected, as that neighbouring country's main supply and transit routes pass through Georgia and Poti's harbour in particular. The security of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was also endangered, which made some people in Washington very nervous!

Same story in Abkhazia, where the secessionist forces took total control of all the disputed territories and expelled the collapsing Georgian regulars from the disputed and highly strategic Kodori Gorge (see map). They reasserted their absolute independence from Tbilisi and reaffirmed their strategic alignment with Mother Russia.

The short war turned out to be very ugly, a brutal lesson in regional "real-politics". Moscow was in no joking mood and sent a very loud and clear message: "Do not mess with me in my own historical backyard, and that includes the Caucasus". The same message to NATO was also crystal clear: "Better know your limits, because we are going to set them in any case!"

The war ended in August 17, and by that time there was not much left to fight for.

Either Tbilisi was badly misled by its over enthusiastic patrons and allies, or it had decided to adopt a fatalistic "It's now or never'' type of cow-boy approach to re-establish its authority over south Ossetia and Abkhazia. The jury is still out, but the real reasons for such adventurous approach were probably a mix of the two scenarios.


Who looks more scared: Georgian President Saakashvili or his bodyguards?
Note the use of NATO sub-machine guns as opposed to the classical Russian AK-47s, as part of Georgia's deliberate "Western" image remake.



The war was indeed short and very unequal. The total capitulation of Georgia was not surprising. Rather more surprising was Moscow's swift and determined response as well as the lack of any tangible support from Georgia's supposed allies in the West. Tbilisi's flirtation with NATO and especially Washington was exposed to its bare bones and Saakashvili had nowhere to hide. Moscow could have taken him down along with his government, but chose to spare his life and not to topple the Government. Tens of thousands of Georgian refugees were not as fortunate as their well spoken but obviously so wise president. They are still suffering today.

As a result, South Ossetia and Abkhazia became even more independent than before. The Georgian army will need years to rebuild itself and its credibility as a viable fighting force. The country's infrastructure was heavily damaged and a huge humanitarian problem. Not many positives for Georgia.
Most observers blame Saakashvili for this catastrophe. The United States and NATO could not do much except for sending couple of warships with "humanitarian aid'' to support the victimised Georgian brothers. Tbilisi's government was reminded something most seventh graders around the world would know: You do not mess with Russia in his own backyard, otherwise you will get a very bloodied nose, crippled arms and an amputated leg or two.
Georgia cried foul and blamed the separatist movements, but her own treatment of Georgia"s minorities does not inspire much confidence. The very sorry state of the Armenian minority in the southern Javakhk-Akhalkalaki region is another serious case of concern. Tbilisi needs to have a hard look in the mirror before formulating any kind of accusations of separatism toward the want away minorities. Javakhk’s Armenians face almost systematic discrimination, their churches confiscated and converted, schools forgotten and the region's already archaic infrastructure abandoned. There is a state of total desolation and neglect of Javakhk's socio-economic situation, in a concerted effort to alter that province’s ethnic composition and assimilate the population into "mainstream" Georgian.


President Serge Sarkisyan of Armenia greeting his Georgian counterpart in Yerevan. Saakashvili assured that he is sparing no efforts to improve the treatment of the Armenian minority in Georgia, but concrete results are scarce. Some felt that Armenia gave the Georgian President too much respect he did not fully deserve. Armenia is landlocked, badly needs Georgia for most external trade and transit and suffered huge financial losses because of the war. The borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed due to embargo and conflict.


So what was the mystery behind Georgia's ill-fated adventures? Were there promised political as well as military support which failed to materialize? Did Saakashvili think that his western education, fluent English language skills, media savvy approach and CNN-friendly sound bites would be enough to stop the Russian tanks from crushing his troops and destroying his country?

Now Saakashvili can certainly kiss goodbye to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both firmly attached to Russia. His very risky poker move backfired and his allies and advisers did not have a plan B to rescue him from losing face and territory. On the eve of the war's first anniversary, a NATO spokesman in Brussels even announced that "Georgia is not yet ready for NATO membership", an admission of total failure.


Both NATO and Uncle Sam were reduced to marginal observers while Putin was firmly in the driver's seat.


Even American vice president Joseph Biden's recent address to the Tbilisi Parliament could not mask the plain and painful truth. Financial aid to reconstruct Georgia may pour in from the West but that is not enough to stop Russian tanks or retake lost territories. There are definite limits of what Washington and NATO can accomplish in the Caucasus. All the flag raising ceremonies, bonfires, candle vigils marking the first anniversary of the war will not do much in terms of getting South Ossetia and Abkhazia back.

As Elton John would sing:

It's sad, so sad,
It's a sad, sad situation,
And it's getting more and more absurd.
Oh it seems to me that sorry seems to be the hardest word.

© Krikor Tersakian,  Aug 5, 2009

First Anniversary of Georgia's bloodied nose

Georgia's ill fated attempt to reclaim South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a total disaster. Was it wrong advice from "friends" or just an Indiana Jones style adventure from Tbilisi? Russia did not lose time to crush the over optimistic Georgians and practically annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Click on map to enlarge.

August 7-8, 2008 were memorable days.

The whole world was glued to the TV sets for the stunning opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. The "Bird's Nest", or the Beijing National Stadium had become the epicentre of the world.

Yet on practically the same day, the tiny Caucasian state of Georgia had launched massive attacks on the secessionist South Ossetia province, directly challenging Russia. The timing of the Georgian attack was very bizarre and intriguing: A major offensive within a few hours of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremonies? What was going on and who was really pushing for such a suicidal showdown?

The Georgian government claimed it was only responding to the constant shelling and intimidation from South Ossetia and was forced to send in its tanks to retake the rebel-held regional capital Tsikavali. Tbilisi wanted to swiftly reoccupy South Ossetia, but this large scale offensive was bizarre both in its timing and the ultra optimism about its possible success. Moscow did not find all this funny and the Russian Bear got ready to pounce back, and it did.

Georgia's tensions with Russia and the two breakaway regions have always been high since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but they became even higher ever since Mikhael Saakashvili came to power on 25 January 2004. The new President was determined to move Georgia much closer to the Western sphere and out of the Russian zone of influence, as if Russia did not exist next door. Georgia demanded the closure of all Russian military bases on its territories, put itself firmly in the Western camp, established supposedly very close ties with the "Oil and Gas obsessed" Bush administration and even applied to join NATO as a full member state: this was the ultimate insult to Russia.

Georgia's anti Russian stance since the fall of the Soviet empire was amplified by the training of the Georgian troops by some 170 NATO military advisers and were supplied with Western military fatigues and some military hardware. The Georgians obviously came to have a highly overestimated and distorted image of their new military might and political support from the forces opposing Russia. And that proved to be a fatal miscalculation.

Mr Saakashvili was also eagerly waiting for the day he would try to bring a military solution to the Ossetia and Abkhazia problems and restore Tbilisi's authority over these regions once and for all, just like he had successfully done in Adjaria-Batumi in 2004. (Important to note that Adjaria has no common borders with Russia, an crucial fact in Georgia's military success).



The message from this Russian soldier to the Georgians is finger clear. The picture is of a Russian convoy on the battlefront. The Russian easily crushed all forms of organised Georgian armed resistance.


Moscow's response was pretty swift, with mounting pressure to destabilise the Georgian Government through South Ossetia and of Abkhazia, which both share long borders and close ties with Russia. Moscow claimed to be under the obligation to defend the Russian citizens of these provinces and moved towards the recognition of these regions as "independent". Just like the West had acted to recognise the legitimacy of Kosovo's Independence from Serbia. Therefore the rationale was straight forward:If the West can recognise a seperate Kosovo, then why not recognise independent Ossetia and Abkhazia? Georgia called all these developments as "shameless land grabs", while Moscow called them "self determination of these freedom seeking Russian citizens".

The war between the two looked inevitable, but few expected Saakashvili to send in his troops first! The ant attacking the elephant type of a mismatch.

In any case, something went wrong with president Saakashvili's entourage, when he decided to force a war. He had indeed timed this military attacks to coincide with the Olympics despite the claims otherwise, but that looked a bit like a medieval military strategy. Countries used to attack enemy states when the other King was away for a while on a hunting expedition in the remote woods or attending a prince's week long wedding festivities...
Vladimir Putin was in fact in Beijing when the news of the attacks broke out, but he did not waste any time to fly to the conflict zone and assume direct control of the events and assume the driver's seat. Within a few hours Moscow had already moved in. The Russian army recaptured South Ossetia and the tanks were on their way to Gori, into Georgia proper. The Russians soon cut the main road linking the capital Tbilisi to the ports on the Black Sea. All significant military and strategic sites in Georgia were bombarded and the country's fragile infrastructure heavily damaged or simply occupied. The Russian Black Sea fleet imposed a total maritime embargo. Poti and the nearby town of Seneki were taken. Russian troops reached the outskirts of Tbilisi and established checkpoints. The Tbilisi international airport was shut down, while the military airfields of Marneuli and Vaziani were heavily bombed.
Like in most wars, the civilian populations paid the ultimate price, as tens of thousands were ethnically cleansed and expelled from their homes. More than 400 people lost their lives, thousands injured and many more lost their homes and were unfortunately displaced.
A Georgian woman holding her baby cries over her damaged home in Gori, Georgia, just outside the breakaway province of South Ossetia Aug. 10, 2008. (David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters)




Georgia was practically fragmented into pieces and Tbilisi government was reduced to a mere scared spectator's role, hiding in underground shelters and arranging for the occasional candlelight press conferences to the media.

Naturally the war affected the whole region. Landlocked Armenia was deeply affected, as that neighbouring country's main supply and transit routes pass through Georgia and Poti's harbour in particular. The security of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was also endangered, which made some people in Washington very nervous!

Same story in Abkhazia, where the secessionist forces took total control of all the disputed territories and expelled the collapsing Georgian regulars from the disputed and highly strategic Kodori Gorge (see map). They reasserted their absolute independence from Tbilisi and reaffirmed their strategic alignment with Mother Russia.

The short war turned out to be very ugly, a brutal lesson in regional "real-politics". Moscow was in no joking mood and sent a very loud and clear message: "Do not mess with me in my own historical backyard, and that includes the Caucasus". The same message to NATO was also crystal clear: "Better know your limits, because we are going to set them in any case!"

The war ended in August 17, and by that time there was not much left to fight for.

Either Tbilisi was badly misled by its over enthusiastic patrons and allies, or it had decided to adopt a fatalistic "It's now or never'' type of cow-boy approach to re-establish its authority over south Ossetia and Abkhazia. The jury is still out, but the real reasons for such adventurous approach were probably a mix of the two scenarios.


Who looks more scared: Georgian President Saakashvili or his bodyguards?
Note the use of NATO sub-machine guns as opposed to the classical Russian AK-47s, as part of Georgia's deliberate "Western" image remake.



The war was indeed short and very unequal. The total capitulation of Georgia was not surprising. Rather more surprising was Moscow's swift and determined response as well as the lack of any tangible support from Georgia's supposed allies in the West. Tbilisi's flirtation with NATO and especially Washington was exposed to its bare bones and Saakashvili had nowhere to hide. Moscow could have taken him down along with his government, but chose to spare his life and not to topple the Government. Tens of thousands of Georgian refugees were not as fortunate as their well spoken but obviously so wise president. They are still suffering today.



As a result, South Ossetia and Abkhazia became even more independent than before. The Georgian army will need years to rebuild itself and its credibility as a viable fighting force. The country's infrastructure was heavily damaged and a huge humanitarian problem. Not many positives for Georgia.
Most observers blame Saakashvili for this catastrophe. The United States and NATO could not do much except for sending couple of warships with "humanitarian aid'' to support the victimised Georgian brothers. Tbilisi's government was reminded something most seventh graders around the world would know: You do not mess with Russia in his own backyard, otherwise you will get a very bloodied nose, crippled arms and an amputated leg or two.
Georgia cried foul and blamed the separatist movements, but her own treatment of Georgia"s minorities does not inspire much confidence. The very sorry state of the Armenian minority in the southern Javakhk-Akhalkalaki region is another serious case of concern. Tbilisi needs to have a hard look in the mirror before formulating any kind of accusations of separatism toward the want away minorities. Javakhk’s Armenians face almost systematic discrimination, their churches confiscated and converted, schools forgotten and the region's already archaic infrastructure abandoned. There is a state of total desolation and neglect of Javakhk's socio-economic situation, in a concerted effort to alter that province’s ethnic composition and assimilate the population into "mainstream" Georgian.


President Serge Sarkisyan of Armenia greeting his Georgian counterpart in Yerevan. Saakashvili assured that he is sparing no efforts to improve the treatment of the Armenian minority in Georgia, but concrete results are scarce. Some felt that Armenia gave the Georgian President too much respect he did not fully deserve. Armenia is landlocked, badly needs Georgia for most external trade and transit and suffered huge financial losses because of the war. The borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed due to embargo and conflict.

So what was the mystery behind Georgia's ill-fated adventures? Were there promised political as well as military support which failed to materialise? Did Saakashvili think that his western education, fluent English language skills, media savvy approach and CNN-friendly sound bites would be enough to stop the Russian tanks from crushing his troops and destroying his country?
Now Saakashvili can certainly kiss goodbye to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both firmly attached to Russia. His very risky poker move backfired and his allies and advisers did not have a plan B to rescue him from losing face and territory. On the eve of the war's first anniversary, a NATO spokesman in Brussels even announced that "Georgia is not yet ready for NATO membership", an admission of total failure.


Both NATO and Uncle Sam were reduced to marginal observers while Putin was firmly in the driver's seat.


Even American vice president Joseph Biden's recent address to the Tbilisi Parliament could not mask the plain and painful truth. Financial aid to reconstruct Georgia may pour in from the West but that is not enough to stop Russian tanks or retake lost territories. There are definite limits of what Washington and NATO can accomplish in the Caucasus. All the flag raising ceremonies, bonfires, candle vigils marking the first anniversary of the war will not do much in terms of getting South Ossetia and Abkhazia back.
As Elton John would sing:
It's sad, so sad,
It's a sad, sad situation,
And it's getting more and more absurd.
Oh it seems to me that sorry seems to be the hardest word.

© Krikor Tersakian, Montreal Aug 5, 2009

First Anniversary of Georgia's bloodied nose

Georgia's ill fated attempt to reclaim South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a total disaster. Was it wrong advice from "friends" or just an Indiana Jones style adventure from Tbilisi? Russia did not lose time to crush the over optimistic Georgians and practically annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Click on map to enlarge.

August 7-8, 2008 were memorable days.

The whole world was glued to the TV sets for the stunning opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. The "Bird's Nest", or the Beijing National Stadium had become the epicentre of the world.

Yet on practically the same day, the tiny Caucasian state of Georgia had launched massive attacks on the secessionist South Ossetia province, directly challenging Russia. The timing of the Georgian attack was very bizarre and intriguing: A major offensive within a few hours of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremonies? What was going on and who was really pushing for such a suicidal showdown?

The Georgian government claimed it was only responding to the constant shelling and intimidation from South Ossetia and was forced to send in its tanks to retake the rebel-held regional capital Tsikavali. Tbilisi wanted to swiftly reoccupy South Ossetia, but this large scale offensive was bizarre both in its timing and the ultra optimism about its possible success. Moscow did not find all this funny and the Russian Bear got ready to pounce back, and it did.

Georgia's tensions with Russia and the two breakaway regions have always been high since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but they became even higher ever since Mikhael Saakashvili came to power on 25 January 2004. The new President was determined to move Georgia much closer to the Western sphere and out of the Russian zone of influence, as if Russia did not exist next door. Georgia demanded the closure of all Russian military bases on its territories, put itself firmly in the Western camp, established supposedly very close ties with the "Oil and Gas obsessed" Bush administration and even applied to join NATO as a full member state: this was the ultimate insult to Russia.

Georgia's anti Russian stance since the fall of the Soviet empire was amplified by the training of the Georgian troops by some 170 NATO military advisers and were supplied with Western military fatigues and some military hardware. The Georgians obviously came to have a highly overestimated and distorted image of their new military might and political support from the forces opposing Russia. And that proved to be a fatal miscalculation.

Mr Saakashvili was also eagerly waiting for the day he would try to bring a military solution to the Ossetia and Abkhazia problems and restore Tbilisi's authority over these regions once and for all, just like he had successfully done in Adjaria-Batumi in 2004. (Important to note that Adjaria has no common borders with Russia, an crucial fact in Georgia's military success).

The message from this Russian soldier to the Georgians is finger clear. The picture is of a Russian convoy on the battlefront. The Russian easily crushed all forms of organised Georgian armed resistance.

Moscow's response was pretty swift, with mounting pressure to destabilise the Georgian Government through South Ossetia and of Abkhazia, which both share long borders and close ties with Russia. Moscow claimed to be under the obligation to defend the Russian citizens of these provinces and moved towards the recognition of these regions as "independent". Just like the West had acted to recognise the legitimacy of Kosovo's Independence from Serbia. Therefore the rationale was straight forward:If the West can recognise a seperate Kosovo, then why not recognise independent Ossetia and Abkhazia? Georgia called all these developments as "shameless land grabs", while Moscow called them "self determination of these freedom seeking Russian citizens".

The war between the two looked inevitable, but few expected Saakashvili to send in his troops first! The ant attacking the elephant type of a mismatch.

In any case, something went wrong with president Saakashvili's entourage, when he decided to force a war. He had indeed timed this military attacks to coincide with the Olympics despite the claims otherwise, but that looked a bit like a medieval military strategy. Countries used to attack enemy states when the other King was away for a while on a hunting expedition in the remote woods or attending a prince's week long wedding festivities...

Vladimir Putin was in fact in Beijing when the news of the attacks broke out, but he did not waste any time to fly to the conflict zone and assume direct control of the events and assume the driver's seat. Within a few hours Moscow had already moved in. The Russian army recaptured South Ossetia and the tanks were on their way to Gori, into Georgia proper. The Russians soon cut the main road linking the capital Tbilisi to the ports on the Black Sea. All significant military and strategic sites in Georgia were bombarded and the country's fragile infrastructure heavily damaged or simply occupied. The Russian Black Sea fleet imposed a total maritime embargo. Poti and the nearby town of Seneki were taken. Russian troops reached the outskirts of Tbilisi and established checkpoints. The Tbilisi international airport was shut down, while the military airfields of Marneuli and Vaziani were heavily bombed.

Like in most wars, the civilian populations paid the ultimate price, as tens of thousands were ethnically cleansed and expelled from their homes. More than 400 people lost their lives, thousands injured and many more lost their homes and were unfortunately displaced.

A Georgian woman holding her baby cries over her damaged home in Gori, Georgia, just outside the breakaway province of South Ossetia Aug. 10, 2008. (David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters)

Georgia was practically fragmented into pieces and Tbilisi government was reduced to a mere scared spectator's role, hiding in underground shelters and arranging for the occasional candlelight press conferences to the media.

Naturally the war affected the whole region. Landlocked Armenia was deeply affected, as that neighbouring country's main supply and transit routes pass through Georgia and Poti's harbour in particular. The security of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was also endangered, which made some people in Washington very nervous!

Same story in Abkhazia, where the secessionist forces took total control of all the disputed territories and expelled the collapsing Georgian regulars from the disputed and highly strategic Kodori Gorge (see map). They reasserted their absolute independence from Tbilisi and reaffirmed their strategic alignment with Mother Russia.

The short war turned out to be very ugly, a brutal lesson in regional "real-politics". Moscow was in no joking mood and sent a very loud and clear message: "Do not mess with me in my own historical backyard, and that includes the Caucasus". The same message to NATO was also crystal clear: "Better know your limits, because we are going to set them in any case!"

The war ended in August 17, and by that time there was not much left to fight for.

Either Tbilisi was badly misled by its over enthusiastic patrons and allies, or it had decided to adopt a fatalistic "It's now or never'' type of cow-boy approach to re-establish its authority over south Ossetia and Abkhazia. The jury is still out, but the real reasons for such adventurous approach were probably a mix of the two scenarios.

Who looks more scared: Georgian President Saakashvili or his bodyguards?
Note the use of NATO sub-machine guns as opposed to the classical Russian AK-47s, as part of Georgia's deliberate "Western" image remake.

The war was indeed short and very unequal. The total capitulation of Georgia was not surprising. Rather more surprising was Moscow's swift and determined response as well as the lack of any tangible support from Georgia's supposed allies in the West. Tbilisi's flirtation with NATO and especially Washington was exposed to its bare bones and Saakashvili had nowhere to hide. Moscow could have taken him down along with his government, but chose to spare his life and not to topple the Government. Tens of thousands of Georgian refugees were not as fortunate as their well spoken but obviously so wise president. They are still suffering today.

As a result, South Ossetia and Abkhazia became even more independent than before. The Georgian army will need years to rebuild itself and its credibility as a viable fighting force. The country's infrastructure was heavily damaged and a huge humanitarian problem. Not many positives for Georgia.

Most observers blame Saakashvili for this catastrophe. The United States and NATO could not do much except for sending couple of warships with "humanitarian aid'' to support the victimised Georgian brothers. Tbilisi's government was reminded something most seventh graders around the world would know: You do not mess with Russia in his own backyard, otherwise you will get a very bloodied nose, crippled arms and an amputated leg or two.

Georgia cried foul and blamed the separatist movements, but her own treatment of Georgia"s minorities does not inspire much confidence. The very sorry state of the Armenian minority in the southern Javakhk-Akhalkalaki region is another serious case of concern. Tbilisi needs to have a hard look in the mirror before formulating any kind of accusations of separatism toward the want away minorities. Javakhk’s Armenians face almost systematic discrimination, their churches confiscated and converted, schools forgotten and the region's already archaic infrastructure abandoned. There is a state of total desolation and neglect of Javakhk's socio-economic situation, in a concerted effort to alter that province’s ethnic composition and assimilate the population into "mainstream" Georgian.

President Serge Sarkisyan of Armenia greeting his Georgian counterpart in Yerevan. Saakashvili assured that he is sparing no efforts to improve the treatment of the Armenian minority in Georgia, but concrete results are scarce. Some felt that Armenia gave the Georgian President too much respect he did not fully deserve. Armenia is landlocked, badly needs Georgia for most external trade and transit and suffered huge financial losses because of the war. The borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed due to embargo and conflict.

So what was the mystery behind Georgia's ill-fated adventures? Were there promised political as well as military support which failed to materialise? Did Saakashvili think that his western education, fluent English language skills, media savvy approach and CNN-friendly sound bites would be enough to stop the Russian tanks from crushing his troops and destroying his country?

Now Saakashvili can certainly kiss goodbye to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both firmly attached to Russia. His very risky poker move backfired and his allies and advisers did not have a plan B to rescue him from losing face and territory. On the eve of the war's first anniversary, a NATO spokesman in Brussels even announced that "Georgia is not yet ready for NATO membership", an admission of total failure.

Both NATO and Uncle Sam were reduced to marginal observers while Putin was firmly in the driver's seat.

Even American vice president Joseph Biden's recent address to the Tbilisi Parliament could not mask the plain and painful truth. Financial aid to reconstruct Georgia may pour in from the West but that is not enough to stop Russian tanks or retake lost territories. There are definite limits of what Washington and NATO can accomplish in the Caucasus. All the flag raising ceremonies, bonfires, candle vigils marking the first anniversary of the war will not do much in terms of getting South Ossetia and Abkhazia back.

As Elton John would sing:

It's sad, so sad,

It's a sad, sad situation,

And it's getting more and more absurd.

Oh it seems to me that sorry seems to be the hardest word.

© Krikor Tersakian, Montreal Aug 5, 2009

First Anniversary of Georgia's bloodied nose

Georgia's ill fated attempt to reclaim South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a total disaster. Was it wrong advice from "friends" or just an Indiana Jones style adventure from Tbilisi? Russia did not lose time to crush the over optimistic Georgians and practically annex South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Click on map to enlarge.

August 7-8, 2008 were memorable days.

The whole world was glued to the TV sets for the stunning opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. The "Bird's Nest", or the Beijing National Stadium had become the epicentre of the world.

Yet on practically the same day, the tiny Caucasian state of Georgia had launched massive attacks on the secessionist South Ossetia province, directly challenging Russia. The timing of the Georgian attack was very bizarre and intriguing: A major offensive within a few hours of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremonies? What was going on and who was really pushing for such a suicidal showdown?

The Georgian government claimed it was only responding to the constant shelling and intimidation from South Ossetia and was forced to send in its tanks to retake the rebel-held regional capital Tsikavali. Tbilisi wanted to swiftly reoccupy South Ossetia, but this large scale offensive was bizarre both in its timing and the ultra optimism about its possible success. Moscow did not find all this funny and the Russian Bear got ready to pounce back, and it did.

Georgia's tensions with Russia and the two breakaway regions have always been high since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but they became even higher ever since Mikhael Saakashvili came to power on 25 January 2004. The new President was determined to move Georgia much closer to the Western sphere and out of the Russian zone of influence, as if Russia did not exist next door. Georgia demanded the closure of all Russian military bases on its territories, put itself firmly in the Western camp, established supposedly very close ties with the "Oil and Gas obsessed" Bush administration and even applied to join NATO as a full member state: this was the ultimate insult to Russia.

Georgia's anti Russian stance since the fall of the Soviet empire was amplified by the training of the Georgian troops by some 170 NATO military advisers and were supplied with Western military fatigues and some military hardware. The Georgians obviously came to have a highly overestimated and distorted image of their new military might and political support from the forces opposing Russia. And that proved to be a fatal miscalculation.

Mr Saakashvili was also eagerly waiting for the day he would try to bring a military solution to the Ossetia and Abkhazia problems and restore Tbilisi's authority over these regions once and for all, just like he had successfully done in Adjaria-Batumi in 2004. (Important to note that Adjaria has no common borders with Russia, an crucial fact in Georgia's military success).

The message from this Russian soldier to the Georgians is finger clear. The picture is of a Russian convoy on the battlefront. The Russian easily crushed all forms of organised Georgian armed resistance.

Moscow's response was pretty swift, with mounting pressure to destabilise the Georgian Government through South Ossetia and of Abkhazia, which both share long borders and close ties with Russia. Moscow claimed to be under the obligation to defend the Russian citizens of these provinces and moved towards the recognition of these regions as "independent". Just like the West had acted to recognise the legitimacy of Kosovo's Independence from Serbia. Therefore the rationale was straight forward:If the West can recognise a seperate Kosovo, then why not recognise independent Ossetia and Abkhazia? Georgia called all these developments as "shameless land grabs", while Moscow called them "self determination of these freedom seeking Russian citizens".

The war between the two looked inevitable, but few expected Saakashvili to send in his troops first! The ant attacking the elephant type of a mismatch.

In any case, something went wrong with president Saakashvili's entourage, when he decided to force a war. He had indeed timed this military attacks to coincide with the Olympics despite the claims otherwise, but that looked a bit like a medieval military strategy. Countries used to attack enemy states when the other King was away for a while on a hunting expedition in the remote woods or attending a prince's week long wedding festivities...

Vladimir Putin was in fact in Beijing when the news of the attacks broke out, but he did not waste any time to fly to the conflict zone and assume direct control of the events and assume the driver's seat. Within a few hours Moscow had already moved in. The Russian army recaptured South Ossetia and the tanks were on their way to Gori, into Georgia proper. The Russians soon cut the main road linking the capital Tbilisi to the ports on the Black Sea. All significant military and strategic sites in Georgia were bombarded and the country's fragile infrastructure heavily damaged or simply occupied. The Russian Black Sea fleet imposed a total maritime embargo. Poti and the nearby town of Seneki were taken. Russian troops reached the outskirts of Tbilisi and established checkpoints. The Tbilisi international airport was shut down, while the military airfields of Marneuli and Vaziani were heavily bombed.

Like in most wars, the civilian populations paid the ultimate price, as tens of thousands were ethnically cleansed and expelled from their homes. More than 400 people lost their lives, thousands injured and many more lost their homes and were unfortunately displaced.

A Georgian woman holding her baby cries over her damaged home in Gori, Georgia, just outside the breakaway province of South Ossetia Aug. 10, 2008. (David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters)

Georgia was practically fragmented into pieces and Tbilisi government was reduced to a mere scared spectator's role, hiding in underground shelters and arranging for the occasional candlelight press conferences to the media.

Naturally the war affected the whole region. Landlocked Armenia was deeply affected, as that neighbouring country's main supply and transit routes pass through Georgia and Poti's harbour in particular. The security of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was also endangered, which made some people in Washington very nervous!

Same story in Abkhazia, where the secessionist forces took total control of all the disputed territories and expelled the collapsing Georgian regulars from the disputed and highly strategic Kodori Gorge (see map). They reasserted their absolute independence from Tbilisi and reaffirmed their strategic alignment with Mother Russia.

The short war turned out to be very ugly, a brutal lesson in regional "real-politics". Moscow was in no joking mood and sent a very loud and clear message: "Do not mess with me in my own historical backyard, and that includes the Caucasus". The same message to NATO was also crystal clear: "Better know your limits, because we are going to set them in any case!"

The war ended in August 17, and by that time there was not much left to fight for.

Either Tbilisi was badly misled by its over enthusiastic patrons and allies, or it had decided to adopt a fatalistic "It's now or never'' type of cow-boy approach to re-establish its authority over south Ossetia and Abkhazia. The jury is still out, but the real reasons for such adventurous approach were probably a mix of the two scenarios.

Who looks more scared: Georgian President Saakashvili or his bodyguards?
Note the use of NATO sub-machine guns as opposed to the classical Russian AK-47s, as part of Georgia's deliberate "Western" image remake.

The war was indeed short and very unequal. The total capitulation of Georgia was not surprising. Rather more surprising was Moscow's swift and determined response as well as the lack of any tangible support from Georgia's supposed allies in the West. Tbilisi's flirtation with NATO and especially Washington was exposed to its bare bones and Saakashvili had nowhere to hide. Moscow could have taken him down along with his government, but chose to spare his life and not to topple the Government. Tens of thousands of Georgian refugees were not as fortunate as their well spoken but obviously so wise president. They are still suffering today.

As a result, South Ossetia and Abkhazia became even more independent than before. The Georgian army will need years to rebuild itself and its credibility as a viable fighting force. The country's infrastructure was heavily damaged and a huge humanitarian problem. Not many positives for Georgia.

Most observers blame Saakashvili for this catastrophe. The United States and NATO could not do much except for sending couple of warships with "humanitarian aid'' to support the victimised Georgian brothers. Tbilisi's government was reminded something most seventh graders around the world would know: You do not mess with Russia in his own backyard, otherwise you will get a very bloodied nose, crippled arms and an amputated leg or two.

Georgia cried foul and blamed the separatist movements, but her own treatment of Georgia"s minorities does not inspire much confidence. The very sorry state of the Armenian minority in the southern Javakhk-Akhalkalaki region is another serious case of concern. Tbilisi needs to have a hard look in the mirror before formulating any kind of accusations of separatism toward the want away minorities. Javakhk’s Armenians face almost systematic discrimination, their churches confiscated and converted, schools forgotten and the region's already archaic infrastructure abandoned. There is a state of total desolation and neglect of Javakhk's socio-economic situation, in a concerted effort to alter that province’s ethnic composition and assimilate the population into "mainstream" Georgian.

President Serge Sarkisyan of Armenia greeting his Georgian counterpart in Yerevan. Saakashvili assured that he is sparing no efforts to improve the treatment of the Armenian minority in Georgia, but concrete results are scarce. Some felt that Armenia gave the Georgian President too much respect he did not fully deserve. Armenia is landlocked, badly needs Georgia for most external trade and transit and suffered huge financial losses because of the war. The borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed due to embargo and conflict.

So what was the mystery behind Georgia's ill-fated adventures? Were there promised political as well as military support which failed to materialise? Did Saakashvili think that his western education, fluent English language skills, media savvy approach and CNN-friendly sound bites would be enough to stop the Russian tanks from crushing his troops and destroying his country?

Now Saakashvili can certainly kiss goodbye to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both firmly attached to Russia. His very risky poker move backfired and his allies and advisers did not have a plan B to rescue him from losing face and territory. On the eve of the war's first anniversary, a NATO spokesman in Brussels even announced that "Georgia is not yet ready for NATO membership", an admission of total failure.

Both NATO and Uncle Sam were reduced to marginal observers while Putin was firmly in the driver's seat.

Even American vice president Joseph Biden's recent address to the Tbilisi Parliament could not mask the plain and painful truth. Financial aid to reconstruct Georgia may pour in from the West but that is not enough to stop Russian tanks or retake lost territories. There are definite limits of what Washington and NATO can accomplish in the Caucasus. All the flag raising ceremonies, bonfires, candle vigils marking the first anniversary of the war will not do much in terms of getting South Ossetia and Abkhazia back.

As Elton John would sing:

It's sad, so sad,

It's a sad, sad situation,

And it's getting more and more absurd.

Oh it seems to me that sorry seems to be the hardest word.

© Krikor Tersakian, Montreal Aug 5, 2009